The sharp increase in R&D investment in recent decades has important but unexplored implications for corporate liquidity management. Because R&D has high adjustment costs and is financed with volatile sources, it is very expensive for firms to adjust the flow of R&D in response to transitory finance shocks. The main contribution of this paper is to directly examine whether firms use cash reserves to smooth their R&D expenditures. We estimate dynamic R&D models and find that firms most likely to face financing frictions rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D. In particular, our estimates suggest that young firms used cash holdings to dampen the volatility in R&D by approximately 75% during the 1998-2002 boom and bust in equity issues. Firms less likely to face financing frictions appear to smooth R&D without the use of costly cash holdings. Our findings provide new insights into the value of liquidity and the financing of intangible investment, and suggest that R&D smoothing with cash reserves is now important for understanding cash management for a substantial fraction of publicly traded firms. 
I. Introduction
In recent decades, R&D investment has risen sharply and is now the principal investment for a large fraction of publicly traded U.S. firms. The sharp increase in R&D has important implications for the management of corporate liquidity for at least three reasons. First, financing frictions should be particularly relevant for R&D due to limited collateral value and potentially severe information problems.
Second, for a large fraction of firms, R&D is financed almost exclusively with volatile sources of finance (e.g., cash flow and stock issues). Finally, R&D faces large adjustment costs because most R&D is wage payments to highly skilled technology workers. In particular, firing R&D workers can result in large hiring and training costs as well as the unwanted dissemination of proprietary information on innovation efforts, making it very expensive for firms to adjust the flow of R&D investment in response to temporary changes in the availability of finance. Firms facing financing frictions should therefore have strong incentives to build and manage a buffer stock of liquidity in order to maintain a relatively smooth path of R&D spending.
In this study, we directly examine the role that corporate cash holdings play in buffering the flow of R&D from transitory finance shocks. To our knowledge, this is the first study to test for R&D smoothing with cash holdings and to emphasize its importance for corporate financial policy. Our findings indicate that R&D smoothing is now an important aspect of cash management for a significant fraction of publicly traded firms. In addition to offering new evidence on the impact that corporate liquidity has on real investment decisions, our study has a number of interesting implications. In particular, we offer a new insight into why liquidity can be so valuable for R&D-intensive firms: cash holdings buffer R&D from shocks to finance, thereby partially avoiding the high adjustment costs associated with altering the path of R&D investment. Our study also helps explain how individual firms facing potentially severe financing frictions manage to weather serious finance shocks, and, more broadly, why aggregate R&D investment is so smooth compared to the underlying volatility in key sources of finance.
We explore R&D smoothing with panel data for publicly traded firms in U.S. manufacturing over the time period . We focus on manufacturing because this sector is responsible for nearly twothirds of U.S. private sector R&D. We divide the sample into three periods -1970-1981, 1982-1993 and 1994-2006 -and we sort firms into various groups based on the a priori likelihood they face binding financing constraints. Our primary sample split divides firms into young and mature categories based on the number of years since the firm first appears in Compustat. Several recent studies use age as a proxy for the presence of quantitatively important financing frictions (e.g., Hadlock and Pierce (2009) ), and we expect that cash holdings will be much more important for R&D smoothing among young firms, particularly those depending heavily on volatile sources of finance.
Figures 1A and 1B illustrate many of the main ideas in this paper. The figures report average values of key variables scaled by assets and Winsorized at the 1% level. For young firms ( Figure 1A ), both R&D and cash holdings rise dramatically over the period 1970 to 2006. Stock issues are a very important source of finance by the 1980s and appear to fund most of the sharp rise in R&D. Stock issues also display dramatic "equity cycles," with very sharp declines in periods such as 1988-1989 and 2001-2002 , periods following precipitous declines in Nasdaq stock prices. While there is a substantial cycle in R&D spending in the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) ), R&D is far smoother than new share issues, and neither debt finance nor cash flow appears to be the source of the funds for this smoothing. Rather, young firms appear to build cash reserves when cash flow and stock issues are plentiful and then draw them down in years when equity is less available (e.g., 2001-2002) . In contrast, while mature-firm R&D is very smooth ( Figure 1B ), cash holdings do not appear to play a central role in this smoothing, as expected if mature firms face minimal financing frictions.
To formally examine R&D smoothing with cash holdings, we include changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings) in a dynamic R&D regression that includes cash flow, debt issues, and stock issues (Table 2) . We estimate the R&D regression with a "systems" GMM estimator that accounts for unobserved firm-specific effects and controls for the potential endogeneity of all financial variables, including ΔCashHoldings. Our main prediction is a negative coefficient on ΔCashHoldings in the R&D regression for firms who are likely to face financing frictions: all else equal, reductions in cash holdings free liquidity for R&D. A second prediction is that the coefficient for ΔCashHoldings should be near zero for firms not likely to face substantial frictions and thus able to smooth R&D without the use of costly cash holdings.
For young firms, we find limited evidence of R&D smoothing with cash reserves in the first period (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) when R&D investment is low. In the middle time period (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , the estimated coefficients on ΔCashHoldings are negative, significant, and substantial (in absolute value). We find the strongest evidence of R&D smoothing with cash holdings in the final period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , when R&D intensity is greatest and stock issues are most volatile. The point estimates in the final two periods indicate a quantitatively important link between changes in cash reserves and young-firm R&D spending.
In contrast, for mature firms, the estimated coefficients on ΔCashHoldings are quantitatively small and generally insignificant.
We also use the large change in the availability of equity finance during two narrow windows -1998-2000 and 2000-2002 - to further explore the importance of cash holdings for R&D smoothing. The 1998-2000 period is often referred to as the "bubble period" (e.g., Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008)) because of the dramatic run-up in Nasdaq stock prices and stock issues. The 2000-2002 period contains the largest crash in share prices and stock issues in our data, suggesting a pronounced decline in the availability of finance. In addition, the 2000-2002 window also contains the largest decline in R&D in our data (and the largest single-year reduction in U.S. industrial R&D ever recorded by the NSF). When we estimate the R&D regressions for these windows, we find a strong, negative link between changes in cash holdings and young-firm R&D in both the boom and bust periods, but a small and statistically insignificant link for mature firms, consistent with our predictions. Based on the magnitude of the ΔCashHoldings coefficients, our estimates suggest that young firms used cash holdings to dampen the volatility in R&D by approximately 75% during the 1998-2002 boom and bust in equity issues.
We explore a wide variety of auxiliary regressions and tests of robustness. First, we re-estimate all regressions for alternative splits of the data. We find large negative coefficients for ΔCashHoldings for zero payout firms, small firms, and firms without bond ratings, all sample splits used in the literature to identify firms likely to face binding financing constraints; in contrast, the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings are near zero (and generally insignificant) for positive payout firms, large firms, and firms with bond ratings. We also use a variety of alternative estimation approaches and continue to find strong evidence that young firms rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D. Finally, we estimate identical regressions for physical investment and find small, insignificant coefficients on ΔCashHoldings for both young and mature firms. This finding is consistent with firms having much less need to smooth physical investment with costly cash holdings, in part because physical capital adjustment costs are relatively "modest" (e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) ). Overall, our findings support an interpretation that firms facing financing constraints actively manage their liquid assets to buffer the flow of R&D from temporary changes in the availability of finance.
Our study is related to a number of different literatures. First, our findings are relevant for the empirical literature that considers how cash holdings impact firm performance and market value. Prior work by Harford (1999) and Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) suggests that cash reserves can be value-decreasing because larger firms with weak governance mechanisms may "over spend" on acquisitions and capital investments. Alternatively, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that a sample of firms with large cash holdings have a higher median operating performance than a matched set of firms with lower cash balances. They also report that the sample of high-cash firms is considerably more R&D intensive than the comparison groups. Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that the marginal value of cash is higher for firms more likely to face financing frictions, particularly for those constrained firms that appear to have valuable investment opportunities but low levels of internal finance. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) find that the market value of the marginal dollar of cash is highest in R&D-intensive industries such as computer software, pharmaceuticals, computers, and electronic equipment. Denis and Sibilkov (in press) confirm that cash holdings are more valuable for constrained firms and they provide evidence showing that more cash permits constrained firms to increase investment and that the marginal value of added investment is greater for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. We also provide direct evidence that cash holdings positively impact the real investment spending of constrained firms (but for R&D rather than physical investment) and we provide new insights into how cash holdings can be particularly valuable for R&D-intensive firms.
A number of studies provide theoretical models showing how cash holdings can benefit firms facing financing frictions. Kim, Mauer and Sherman (KMS, 1998) develop and find empirical support for a model where optimal cash holdings is determined by the tradeoff between the cost of holding liquid assets and the benefits of minimizing the need to fund future investment opportunities with costly external finance. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (ACW, 2004) show that a benefit of holding cash is the ability to finance future projects that might arise, and that the greater the importance of future growth opportunities vis-à-vis current opportunities, the more cash firms hoard today. Han and Qiu (2007) assume that future cash flow can not be fully hedged and show that when returns are convex, the greater the volatility of cash flow, the greater the optimal precautionary cash stock. Acharya, Almeida and Campello (AAC, 2007) explore both cash holdings and debt policies and show that firms with "high hedging needs" will prefer to build cash stocks rather than debt capacity to hedge against cash flow shortfalls. One important way our work differs from these studies is that we directly examine the use of cash holdings for investment smoothing rather than the propensity with which firms invest their cash flows in precautionary cash stocks.
Our study also contributes to the relatively small literature on the financing of R&D with stock issues. Kim and Weisbach (2008) explore the motivations for public equity offerings across 38 countries and find that cash holdings and investment (R&D in particular) increase following equity offers. Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (BFP, 2009) show that a significant portion of the U.S. aggregate R&D cycle of the late 1990s and early 2000s can be explained by the corresponding dramatic boom and bust in the availability of stock issues. But they do not consider cash holdings or explore how firms manage to dampen the impact of booms and busts in the availability of finance, thereby smoothing R&D relative to the dramatic fluctuations in equity finance (as suggested by Figure 1A ). Our findings support the broad conclusions in BFP (2009) on the link between equity finance and R&D, but also show that the role of cash holdings is key to understanding both finance-driven fluctuations in R&D and the fact that aggregate R&D has historically been much smoother than key sources of finance. Our findings strongly suggest that the "boom" and "bust" in U.S. aggregate R&D in the 1998-2002 period would have been far greater had firms not smoothed R&D with cash holdings. More generally, these results are relevant for understanding how firms weather any serious decline in the availability of finance.
Finally, our study complements the literature exploring the determinants of corporate cash holdings. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (OPSW, 1999) explore corporate cash holdings for publicly-traded U.S. firms from 1971-1994 and find that cash holdings increase with R&D intensity and are lower for firms with the greatest access to capital markets. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS, 2009) explore the recent sharp rise in cash holdings for U.S. industrial firms and conclude that the main explanation for rising cash stocks is changes in four firm characteristics, one of which is rising R&D. Our findings also underscore the importance of R&D for understanding why firms hold cash: in our sample, cash holdings have risen in lock-step with R&D for young firms engaged in R&D, but there is essentially no rise in cash holdings for firms not reporting R&D.
The next section discusses R&D adjustment costs, the volatility of equity finance, and the testable predictions pertaining to R&D smoothing with cash holdings. Section three provides summary statistics and plots of the data. Section four contains the main econometric evidence directly linking changes in cash and R&D. Section five explores R&D smoothing during the boom and bust in the Nasdaq (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , while section six reports extensive tests of robustness. Section seven discusses some implications of our findings, including the value of liquidity and an explanation for why aggregate R&D is so much smoother than either physical investment or key sources of finance. Section eight summarizes the paper.
II. R&D Smoothing and Empirical Predictions

A. Key Features of R&D Investment
The most important feature of R&D for our analysis is the magnitude of adjustment costs (see Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Hall (2002) ). Most R&D investment consists of wage payments to highly trained scientists, engineers, and other skilled technology workers who often require a great deal of firm-specific training. Thus, cutting R&D typically entails releasing workers. If the cut in R&D is temporary -as in a response to a transitory shock to finance -then new workers need to be hired in future periods, creating additional hiring and training costs. Studies suggest that these costs are often very large.
1 Perhaps even more costly, fired R&D workers know critical proprietary information that firms do not wish to share with competitors, and the dissemination of such information could undermine the value of innovation being undertaken by the firm. Finally, R&D is often conducted in teams, which is disrupted with repeated turnover of workers. All of these reasons suggest that the costs of adjusting R&D are quantitatively important and likely substantially larger than that for physical investment. 2 Thus, firms should be able to save substantial "adjustment costs" by maintaining a smooth path of R&D investment.
A second important feature of R&D is that equity finance appears to be the principal source of funds. Several studies conclude that R&D-intensive firms use comparatively little debt (see the review in
Hall (2002)). One reason is that R&D has very limited collateral value and risky firms typically must pledge collateral to obtain debt finance (Berger and Udell (1990) ). A second reason is that debt finance can lead to problems of financial distress that may be particularly severe for R&D-intensive firms (Cornell and Shapiro (1988), Opler and Titman (1994) ). While equity has several advantages over debt for financing R&D, internal and external equity finance are likely not perfect substitutes. Public stock issues incur sizeable flotation costs, and new share issues may require a "lemons premium" due to asymmetric information (e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984) ). Because nearly all young R&D-intensive firms exhaust internal equity finance, it is likely that a large fraction face financing frictions at the margin.
B. Volatility of Equity Finance
Both internal and external equity are volatile sources of finance (see the discussion in BFP (2009)). The variability of corporate income (and therefore internal equity finance) has long been documented (e.g., Mitchell (1951) ). Stock issues -the key marginal external source of finance for many young publicly traded firms -appear to be even more volatile. Figure 1A Several studies show that stock-market mispricing can substantially impact the cost and use of external equity finance (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2000) ). Based on the market timing literature, the cost of public equity finance was likely relatively low during the extremely large run-up in stock prices on the Nasdaq between 1998-2000, and relatively high during the stock market collapse in [2001] [2002] . We focus specifically on this "bubble period" (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2004)) in Section V. This discussion leads to some basic predictions concerning R&D smoothing with cash holdings.
First, for firms facing financing frictions and actively using cash holdings to smooth R&D, if the change in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings) is included with other sources of finance in an R&D regression, it will attract a negative coefficient since (holding other sources of finance constant) reductions in cash holdings free liquidity for R&D and increases in cash holdings do the opposite. A related prediction is that for firms not facing financing frictions, there is no smoothing role for cash holdings: like other financial factors, the coefficient on ΔCashHoldings in the R&D regression should be approximately zero.
It has long been argued in the financing constraint literature that a regression of investment on financial variables (e.g., cash flow) should generate positive coefficients if there are financing frictions.
3 McLean (2009) shows that firms save a larger fraction of new issue proceeds as cash during "good times" to issue new shares. He also documents an increasing propensity in recent decades for firms to save new issue proceeds as cash. This finding is consistent with our results on the sharp recent rise in R&D spending and corresponding need for cash reserves for R&D smoothing. 4 As noted in the literature (e.g., KMS (1998) and ACW (2004)), cash stocks are costly for a financially constrained firm because higher cash holdings require a reduction in current period investment. Other costs of corporate liquidity are agency costs and the fact that interest earned on firm cash holdings is often taxed at a higher rate than interest earned by individuals (e.g., OPSW (1999) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) ).
A potential weakness of this approach, however, is that the controls for investment demand are likely imperfect. As a consequence, because changes in financial variables correlate positively with changes in profits, the financial variables may simply reflect new information about the profitability of investment.
We emphasize that ΔCashHoldings is positively correlated with R&D and the financial variables, and thus should be positively correlated with investment opportunities. By extension, problems measuring investment demand should also bias upward the estimated coefficients on ΔCashHoldings (i.e., lead to positive coefficients). It is therefore distinctly more challenging to dismiss a negative coefficient on
ΔCashHoldings based on inadequate demand control.
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III. Data, Summary Statistics, and Plots
A. Data
We construct our sample from surviving and non-surviving U.S. incorporated manufacturing firms (two-digit SIC codes 20-39) with coverage in the Compustat database at any time over 1970-2006. We focus on manufacturing because most corporate R&D occurs in this sector. We divide these firms into "positive R&D" and "no R&D" samples based on whether the firm reports positive R&D in a given sample period. The vast majority of the "no R&D" firms are in industries which traditionally do little or no R&D (e.g., apparel, textiles, lumber, furniture, and printing and publishing), suggesting that these firms do not report R&D because it is approximately zero. We focus primarily on the "positive R&D"
sample. While the "no R&D" sample is not useful for directly testing the importance of R&D smoothing with cash holdings, it is valuable for understanding how the level and variability of cash holdings differs across firms, so we also report plots and summary statistics for this sample. Finally, we require firms to both report a stock price and have total assets of at least $1 million before they enter the dataset, and we 5 Fazzari and Petersen (1993) make a similar argument, but for smoothing physical investment with working capital rather than R&D investment with cash holdings. One possible alternative to the smoothing hypothesis that could also generate a negative coefficient on ΔCashHoldings is that firms run down cash reserves to expand R&D investment in response to positive productivity shocks. We note, however, that this explanation predicts a negative correlation between changes in cash holdings and R&D because cash holdings fall so that R&D can increase. For the smoothing hypothesis, on the other hand, cash holdings fall to limit the fall in R&D in the face of a negative finance shock (as suggested in Figure 1A ). In this case, changes in cash holdings and R&D move in the same direction (i.e., the raw correlation is positive, as it is in our data), but the coefficient estimate on ΔCashHoldings is negative because the regression controls for fluctuations in other sources of finance.
exclude firms with fewer than four cash holdings observations in a given sample period since we use GMM estimators that rely on lagged values of regression variables as instruments.
We report summary statistics and regression results for three different sample periods : 1970-1981, 1982-1993 and 1994-2006 . We also split firms based on the number of years since their first stock price appears in Compustat, typically the year of their IPO. Firm age is likely to be strongly correlated with asymmetric information problems and has been used as a proxy for the presence of financing frictions in a number of recent studies (e.g., BFP (2009) (2009)). 6 We classify firms as "young" if their average age in a given sample period is less than or equal fifteen. We discuss the results for sample splits based on size, payout ratio, and presence of a bond rating in Section VI.
B. Summary Statistics
Panel A in Table 1 Turning to the financial variables, gross cash flow is stable over time for mature firms. 7 For young firms, median gross cash flow figures are similar to mature firms in the early period, but drop off somewhat over time. The means, however, decline substantially and are negative in the final period, due to the entry of a large number of unprofitable firms (e.g., Ritter and Welch (2002) and Fama and French 6 Hadlock and Pierce (2009) use qualitative information disclosed by firms to create an index of financing constraints for a large random sample of firms. They then examine a number of proxies used in the literature and conclude that firm age and size are the two variables most related to the qualitative information reported by firms concerning the presence of financing constraints. 7 Because R&D is treated as a current expense for accounting purposes we add R&D expenses to the standard measure of net cash flow (after-tax earnings plus depreciation allowances) to obtain "gross" cash flow (see Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) dwarfed by stock issues. Finally, of particular importance for our study, the stock of cash and cash equivalents (CashHoldings) by young firms rises from 0.088 in the first period to 0.395 in the last period, a more than fourfold increase. For mature firms, the rise in cash holdings is much smaller (0.077 to 0.152). The pattern for median cash holdings is similar to that for the means.
Panel B reports summary statistics for the "no R&D" firms. The "no R&D" sample is much smaller than the sample of firms reporting positive R&D (e.g., in the final period, young firms in Panel B
have less than one-third as many firm-year observations as the young firms in Panel A). There are two noteworthy differences (besides absence of R&D) between the summary statistics reported in the two panels. The first is that "no R&D" firms issue very little stock. The second difference is that firms not reporting R&D have essentially no increase in cash holdings over time: average cash holdings for young firms is 0.089 in the first period and 0.102 in the final period. In the final period, the mean cash-to-assets ratio for young firms not reporting R&D is only 25 percent of the corresponding value for young firms that report positive R&D spending. Thus, across young firms in manufacturing, there is a strong connection between reporting R&D, issuing stock, and holding large (and rising) stocks of cash.
C. Plots of Yearly Averages
Yearly plots of average ratios for the positive R&D sample appear in Figures The R&D ratio for mature firms trends upward very smoothly over time, suggesting that mature firms are very successful at smoothing R&D investment. However, unlike Figure 1A , there is nothing in Figure 1B that suggests mature firms rely extensively on costly cash holdings to smooth R&D, consistent with most mature firms likely having ready access to lines of credit and other financial instruments for smoothing.
Finally, we comment briefly on the plots for young ( Figure 2A ) and mature firms ( Figure 2B) who do not report R&D. Figures 1B and 2B) suggests that, among manufacturing firms, issuing stock and holding large (and rising) reserves of cash is confined almost exclusively to firms that invest in R&D.
IV. Formal Evidence of R&D Smoothing with Cash Holdings
A. Specification and Estimation
BFP (2009) where RD j,t is R&D spending for firm j in period t. R&D is highly persistent and therefore the coefficient on lagged R&D should be close to one, while the expected coefficient on the quadratic term is negative.
Sales growth (Sgwth) and the market-to-book ratio (MarketBook) are included as controls for investment demand. The financial variables include contemporaneous and lagged cash flow (CashFlow), net stock issues (StkIssues), net debt issues (DbtIssues), and changes in cash holdings (ΔCashHoldings).
9 Cash flow, stock issues, and debt issues should all share a positive relation with R&D in firms that face binding financing constraints, though debt issues are relatively unimportant as a source of funds for the typical R&D intensive firm (see Figure 1A ). In contrast, as discussed above, the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings should be negative for firms that rely on cash reserves to smooth R&D. The R&D and financial variables are scaled by the beginning-of-period stock of firm assets. The model includes a firm-specific effect (α j )
to control for all unobserved time-invariant determinants of R&D at the firm level, such as technology and industry characteristics. The model also includes a time-specific effect (d t ) to control for aggregate changes that could affect the demand for R&D.
We estimate equation (1) with the "system" GMM estimator developed for dynamic panel models
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This method jointly estimates a regression of equation (1) in differences with the regression in levels, using lagged levels as instruments for the regression in differences and lagged differences as instruments for the regression in levels. The systems estimator addresses the weak instrument problem that arises from using lagged levels of persistent explanatory variables as instruments for the regression in differences, but it does require an additional moment restriction to hold in the data: differences of the right-hand side variables in equation (1) must not be correlated with the firm-specific effect (Blundell and Bond (1998) ).
We treat all financial variables (including ΔCashHoldings) as potentially endogenous and use lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments for the regression in differences, and lagged differences dated t-2 for the regression in levels. 10 To assess instrument validity we follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and report an m2 test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, which, if present, could render the GMM estimator inconsistent, and a Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions. We also report a difference-in-Hansen test that evaluates the validity of the additional instruments required for systems estimation and used in the levels equation. As we discuss below, a low p-value for either the J-test or difference-in-Hansen test indicates potential problems with instrument validity in just four of the eighteen regressions reported in the following three tables. We find no problems for young firms (the key group) outside of the first period, and no problems for either group in the final period, when R&D and cash holdings are the greatest and tests of R&D smoothing are the most ompel he c ling.
We report one-step GMM coefficient estimates and standard errors in the tables that follow. T standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. Arellano and Bond 10 As we discuss in more detail below, our findings are robust to a number of alternative instrument sets, including starting the instrument set with lagged levels dated t-2 (and lagged differences dated t-1) and extending it to include lagged levels dated t-5 and t-6. Though lagged levels dated t-2 are potentially valid instruments if the error term in equation (1) is i.i.d. (Arellano and Bond (1991) ), we found the validity of the t-2 instruments to be questionable in a number of the regressions.
(1991) recommend using one-step estimates for inference because the standard errors from two-step GMM are downward biased in small samples. Two-step estimates are more efficient, however, so we also estimate equation (1) 
, t-4 to t-6).
We also note that the first period is the least int ring R&D smoothing with cash holdings since R&D intensity is very low.
In the early period (columns one and two), contemporaneous cash flow coefficients are positive and statistically significant for both young and mature firms, and chi-squared tests (bottom of table) reje the null that the sum of the current and lagged coefficients is equal to zero. Other than relatively small positive coefficients on stock issues for young firms, the external finance variables are near zero for both young and mature firms, consistent with the paucity of both stock and debt issues during this period. Fo young firms, the sum of the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings is negative and statis y small (-0.042), consistent with the low R&D intensity in this period.
For young firms in the middle time period, the sum of the coefficients on stock issues is substantial (0.103) and statistically significant, consistent with the rising importance of stock issues in this period. Of greater importance, the coefficients on contemporaneous and lagged ΔCashHoldings are both negative and statistically significant, and the sum of the coefficients is quantitatively substantial (-0.11 This suggests that young firms increasingly relied on cash holdings to smooth R&D in the 1982- The magnitude of the sum of coefficients for stock issues is particularly large (0.188), which, togeth with the size of stock issues indicated by the summary statistics, suggests a very strong link between R&D and stock issues during this period. Most importantly, the coefficients on current and lagged
ΔCashHoldings are negative, large in absolute value (sum is -0.239), and highly significant. In sharp contrast, for mature firms, the sums of cash flow and stock issues are small and the chi-squared tests reject the null that the sums of the coefficients are statistically different from zero. The coefficient fo current ΔCashHoldings is comparatively small (-0.039) and marginally significant, while the lagged coefficient is negative but insignificant (-0.026). The sum of the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings for mature firms is statistically different from zero, due almost entirely to a relatively small number of R&D-intensive firms that switch to "mature" in the final period. 11 We show in the robustne ents on ΔCashHoldings are approximately zero and insignificant for other groups of firms (large, positive payout) which a priori are least likely to face binding financing frictions.
Overall, the results in Table 2 show a strong, negative relation between changes in cash holdin and R&D investment for the firms most likely to face financing frictions. The pattern of coefficients is a expected: as R&D intensity rises and firms become increasingly reliant on volatile stock issues, R&D smoothing with cash holdings becomes an important phenomena for young firms, as can be seen by sharp rise in the absolute size of the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings in the R&D regressions. By the final period the coefficient estimates on ΔCashHoldings suggest a quantitatively important link between changes in cash reserves and young-firm R&D: on average, every one-half standard deviation change in cash holdings corresponds to a change in the R&D-to-assets ratio of 0.067, which is almost 35% of the young-firm R&D ratio in the final period. For comparison, the predicted impact (based on the estimat in Table 2) Table 3 .
The first two columns of Table 3 To evaluate the quantitative importance of the ΔCashHoldings coefficients, we use the point estimates in Table 3 
VI. Auxiliary Tests and Robustness
We now present a number of auxiliary tests of the role that cash holdings play in sm R&D. In this section we focu tensity is the highest and thus the benefits from smoothing should be the greatest.
A. Alternative Sample Splits
The finance literature has utilized a number of sample splits other than firm age to a priori classify firms into groups more or less likely to face financing frictions (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbar Petersen (1988) , Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) , Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) ). In Table   5 , we consider three of the most commonly used criteria: the payout ratio, firm size, and the absence/presence of a bond rating. As argued by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) Gertler and Hubbard (1988) , KMS (1998) and many others have used firm size as a proxy for access to external finance. We split firms into large and small size groups based on average sales during the sample period. We use a 7 the skewed size distribution (sales at the 70 th percentile are only $248 million). Finally, we split firms based on whether or not a bond rating is reported in Compustat.
The results for the final period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ) using these alternative sample splits appear in Table   4 . Other than a marginal Diff-in-Hansen test in the large sales regression, tests of instrument validity indicate no significant problems across the different sample splits. The coefficient estimates in Table   are very similar to the coefficient estimates in the corresponding regressions in Table 2 . In particular, th sum of the coefficients for cash flow and stock issues is positive and statistically significant for zero payout, small, and non-bond rated firms, but quantitatively small and insignificant for positive payout large, and bond-rated firms. More importantly, the estimated coefficients for contemporaneous and lagged ΔCashHoldings for zero payout, small, and non-bond rated firms in Table 4 are similar
ΔCashHoldings coefficients for young firms in Table 2 , consistent with substantial R&D smoothing wi cash holdings. In contrast, for positive payout, large, and bond-rated firms the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings in Table 4 are quantitatively small. In particular, the ΔCashHoldings coefficients are statistically insignificant for positive payout firms and for large firms, suggesting no use of cash h to smooth R&D for the firms least likely to face financing examine smoothing in the early and m coefficients consistent with those reported in Table 2 .
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B. Alternative Estimation Strategies
The findings we present are robust to a number of alternative estimation procedures, instrum sets, and specifications. First, we re-estimate equation (1) using two-step GMM. Though the two-step 12 The payout ratio is computed by scaling dividends plus stock buybacks minus stock issues by beginning-of-period assets. We obtain similar results by splitting at the 50 th and 70 th percentiles of the average payout distribution. 13 We did not have sufficient data on bond ratings to use that sample split in the earliest period.
estimator is more efficient relative to one-step GMM, the standard errors from two-step GMM are downward biased in small samples (e.g., Arellano and Bond (1991) ). We address this downward bias by employing the finite-sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2005) . The two-step estimates are very vels. r essions, so ok ratio as a demand control and continue to find large, negative coefficients on ΔCashH firms, ses as substantial collateral value, possibly permitting the use of debt finance for smoothing, and ii) physical investment has comparatively low adjustment costs, reducing the benefits to smoothing. similar in almost all respects to the results in Table 2 . In particular, we continue to find strong evidence of smoothing with cash holdings for young firms (the sum of the current and lagged ΔCashHoldings is -0.246 with a p-value of 0.000 in the final period). Second, we adjust the instrument set to include levels dated t-2 to t-4 for the regression in differences, and differences dated t-1 for the regression in le Again, the results for young firms are quantitatively similar while the coefficients on ΔCashHoldings fo mature firms are quantitatively small and only marginally significant.
14 Third, in place of firstdifferencing to remove the firm-specific effect, we use an "orthogonal deviations" transformation that eliminates the firm effect by subtracting the forward means of each regression variable (Arellano and Bover (1995) ). With this transformation the financial effects are again similar in magnitude and statistical significance (the sum of ΔCashHoldings for young firms is -0.211 with a p-value of 0.000). Finally, it has long been noted that measurement error in Tobin's Q can bias inference in investment regr we drop the market-to-bo oldings for young firms (sum of ΔCashHoldings is -0.248 with a p-value of 0.000).
C. Physical Investment
We also considered whether changes in cash holdings were related to fixed capital investment with a specification that mirrors equation (1). In the final period, the sum of the coefficients on 
ue of Liquidity
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006, p. 960-967) list ten important unsolved problems in finance, including: "What is the value of liquidity?" Almost all corporate finance textbooks have chapters on cas management, including a discussion of precautionary cash holdings. Explanations of the precaution motive generally center on the fact that cash inflow and outflow are unpredictable and that the less predictable are cash flows, the greater the need for precautionary cash holdings (e.g., Brigham and Dave 2002, p. 705) . The common theme in textbook discussions is "protection against a rainy day." We ca mention of the use of cash holdings for investment smoothing or reducing adjustment cos
As noted in the introduction, recent studies develop models highlighting the benefits of precautionary cash holdings for financially constrained firms. KMS (1998) argue that building cash holdings minimizes the need to obtain costly external finance for future investment projects. Both ACW (2004) and Han and Qiu (2007) show that under plausible conditions it is optimal for constrained firms hold cash reserves to enhance the firm's ability to undertake future investment, and AAC (2007) sho that firms with "high hedging needs" will use cash holdings rather than debt capacity for protection against future cash flow shortfalls. Denis and Sibilkov (in press, p. 21) find that "higher cash holdings a associated with higher levels of investment for constrained firms with high hedging needs." While our work is broadly related to these studies, our insights into the value of liquidity are somewhat different because we focus on R&D, which differs from physical investment in several key ways, including th much higher adjustment costs. We emphasize that cash holdings can give firms better control over present and future adjustment costs of an ongoing R&D program, whose major expenses are the o payroll costs e.
Our focus on R&D ties in well with the literature addressing when cash reserves are likely to be good or bad for shareholders (e.g, OPSW, 1999; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008) . While large firm with relatively weak governance may over spend cash reserves on fixed capital and acquisitions (e.g., Harford, 1999) , young R&D-intensive firms are much less likely to suffer from these agency problem Instead, substantial cash reserves that allow R&D-intensive firms to buffer R&D against temporary negative finance shocks should be associated with higher performance and greater market valuatio Indeed, recent studies provide strong evidence that the marginal dollar of cash is highest in R&D intensive industries (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007) and that firms with large cash balances are more R&D intensive a n.
nd have higher operating performance than firms with lower balances (Mikkelson and . Why tal r and tantial inance but also for uctivity at the economy-wide level.
. R&D
D.
Our findings strongly support the conclusion that rising R&D is a key factor behind the rise in cash Partch, 2003) .
B is Aggregate R&D so Smooth?
It is well known that aggregate R&D has historically been quite smooth compared to fixed capi investment. Yet, BFP (2009) 1998-2002 period, where our estimates indicate that young firms used cash holdings to sharply limit the volatility in R&D. This evidence suggests that part of the reason aggregate R&D is so smooth is that the typical R&D-intensive firm is rather successful at building and utilizing cash holdings to avoid subs alterations to R&D. Such a conclusion has implications not only for corporate f understanding economic growth and prod
C and the Rise in Cash Holdings
BKS (2009) report that the average cash-to-assets ratio (cash ratio) of U.S. industrial firms increased from 10.5% to 23.2% between 1980 to 2006. As discussed above, BKS conclude that the rise in the cash ratio is due primarily to changes in four firm characteristics, one of which is the rise in R& holdings. 16 First, we show a dramatic rise in R&D intensity among young R&D-reporting firms (e.g., Figure 1A ), which, based on our arguments, should have led to a very large increase in the demand for cash holdings to smooth R&D. Second, our regression results strongly confirm the importance of R&D smoothing with cash holdings in recent decades, but only for firms likely to face financing frictions.
Finally, we find that cash holdings have increased lock-step with R&D for firms likely to face financing frictions (e.g., Figure 1A ) and we find essentially no increase in cash holdings for firms not reporting R&D (Figures 2A and 2B ).
VIII. Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to test for R&D smoothing with cash holdings and to emphasize its importance for corporate financial policy. Figure 1A shows that for young manufacturing firms, the path of R&D investment is far less volatile than key sources of finance and that firms appear to accomplish this smoothing by drawing down cash holdings when the availability of finance is low (e.g.,
2001
-2002) and building up cash reserves when finance is readily available. To formally explore the use of cash holdings for R&D smoothing we use GMM to estimate dynamic investment regressions that include the change in cash holdings with other sources of finance (cash flow, new stock issues, and new debt issues) as explanatory variables. For firms relying on cash holdings to smooth R&D, the coefficient on the change in cash holdings should be negative, because reductions in cash free liquidity for R&D.
We find strong evidence of R&D smoothing for firms most likely to face financing frictions, but little evidence that changes in cash holdings impact R&D for firms less likely to be financially constrained.
Furthermore, the link between R&D and the change in cash holdings is particularly strong in both the 1998-2000 boom, and the 2000-2002 bust, in stock prices and equity availability.
Our findings show a direct link between corporate liquidity and real investment decisions and provide a number of related insights. As we have emphasized, R&D has high adjustment costs and is often financed by volatile sources of finance. Based on these facts and our findings, we conclude that one way that liquidity can create value is by allowing constrained firms to maintain a relatively smooth flow of R&D spending in the face of shocks to finance, which reduces the adjustment costs. manufacturing that do not report positive R&D expenditures. All variables are scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are
Winsorized at the 1% level. A firm is classified as mature if it is more than 15 years after the year it first appears in Compustat with a stock price. 
